

ON MEAN-FIELD GAMES

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SUMMARY

I INTRODUCTION

II A SIMPLE CLASS OF EXS (OPTIM.)

III FUNCTIONS OF A "LARGE" NUMBER OF VAR.

IV A CLASS OF DYN. EXS

I INTRODUCTION

- GOAL : Introduce, Justify, Analyse and Apply
 a new class of mathematical models
 for the study of the "average" behavior of a very large
 number of "rational" agents in interaction
- Mean-Field, Self-Consistent type models
 > Nash equilibria for "continua of players"
 (# game-theory : Aumann, Carmona ...)
- Rat. (economics) : "Optimal behavior"
- New mathematical problems > many classical problems
 (kinetic models, Fluid Mechanics, Hartree type eqs., semi-linear eqs...)
 + HJB - stochastic control
- Simplification of games and equilibria in the continuum limit

II A simple ex. in Optimization

state $x_1, \dots, x_N \in \mathbb{R}^d$

player i : criterion $F_i(x)$ $X = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$

Nash point: $(\bar{x}_1, \dots, \bar{x}_N)$ s.t.

$$\bar{x}_i \text{ min. } F_i(\bar{x}_1, \dots, \bar{x}_{i-1}, \cdot, \bar{x}_{i+1}, \dots, \bar{x}_N)$$

(ex. : vacations !)

Natural but plagued with diff. : existence?, uniqueness?, stability?, num. comp.? ...

? $N \rightarrow \infty$: "identical" players" ?

$$F_i(x) = F(x_i; \underbrace{(x_j)_{j \neq i}}_{\text{symmetrie}}) \quad (n \rightarrow F \dots)$$

$$F \in "C(\mathbb{R}^d, \mathbb{R}(\mathbb{R}^d))" \quad F(x_i; \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \delta_{x_j})$$

ex. : $F = F_0(x) + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \mathbb{1}_{|x_i - x_j| < \epsilon} \quad (\epsilon > 0)$

$$F(x, m) = F_0(x) + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \mathbb{1}_{|x_i - x_j| < \epsilon} \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} \uparrow \text{aversion} \\ \downarrow \text{desire} \end{array} \right)$$

- Requires new mathematical tools \rightarrow other applications
 PDE's and dim $\rightarrow \infty$
 large deviations for SPDE
 theo. of
 statistical φ and particles in interaction ...
 ? num. analysis : flows of grids ... ?

• Particle (matter element) = choiceless agent!

• Models for economics and finance, but ...

• Applications to Economics and Finance \rightarrow J.M. Lasry

- Price function
- velocity function
- bubbles (fund managers)
- clubs

J.M. Lasry, PLZ + O. Guéhen: distribution of wealth (Pareto's tails)
 community islands

with P.W. Giraud (ENSMEP): Hotelling's rent and Hubert peak for oil prices

techn. breakthrough" - thermal isolation of resources
 \hookrightarrow model for EDF

Refs: 2 notes Comptes Rendus, 1 survey paper (Jap. J. Math. Soc.)
 web site: Cdf courses 06-07, 07-08, 08-09

"THM": All NASH POINTS (V AS N → ∞ TO A SOL. OF (MFG) MODEL (up to subsequence)

m N. distribution of players ∈ P(R^d)
∀ x ∈ Supp m generate player

(MFG) x is a min of F(·; m)

(MFG) m ∈ P(R^d), Supp(m) ⊂ ArgMin F(·; m)

⇔ m min over P(R^d) ⇔ f: ∫ F(x; m) f(x)

- Facts:
- proof: elementary (but not so simple)
 - existence, stability of some equil., num. emp.
 - uniqueness if F mon. on P

$$\int (F(x; f_1) - F(x; f_2)) (f_1 - f_2) \geq 0$$

- efficiency: if ∃ potential Φ (over P) Φ'(m) = F(x; m)

MFG ⇔ Min Φ(m) over P if convex

ex. (z=0) F(x; m) = F_0(x) + f(m(x))

uniq. (efficiency) if f ↑ (aversion)

nonuniq. if f ↓ (desire)

III The Math. framework for $N \rightarrow \infty$

Functions of N var. as $N \rightarrow \infty$?

Differential info., PDE's as $N \rightarrow \infty$?

Answer: IF SYMMETRY, THEN WAIT ON I!

(with Monge-Kantorovich-Wasserstein metrics d_1, d_2, d_∞)

$$(x_1, \dots, x_N) \in \mathcal{Q} / \mathcal{S}_N \longleftrightarrow \frac{1}{N} \sum_i \delta_{x_i} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{Q})$$

↑
permutation

(\mathcal{Q} = periodic box = torus, \mathbb{R}^d , metric space ...)

→ previous partial observ.: Gumbaum (B.), Matytsin (Th. p.)

THM 1: $\{ u_n \in C(\mathcal{Q}^N) \text{ sym. in } (x_1, \dots, x_N) \}$
"uniform modulus"

then (up to subsequences) $\exists U \in C(\mathcal{P})$

$$\sup_{X \in \mathcal{Q}^N} \| u_n(X) - U(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \delta_{x_i}) \| \xrightarrow{N} 0$$

yields a simple proof of H.S. thm, + duality with H.S.,
extensions (moduli, several groups, retraction ...), p.g.n.,
approximation ...

About the W. metrics (of Otto, Brenner, Villani, Ambrosio ... (7)
 ↳ transport, PDEs, geometry, ...)

ex. $d_{(2)}(m_1, m_2) = \inf_{(X, \gamma)} \{ E[|X - \gamma|^2] \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{law of } X = m_1 \\ \text{law of } \gamma = m_2 \end{array} \}$

$d(\delta_x, \delta_y) = |x - y|$

$d\left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \delta_{x_i}, \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \delta_{y_i}\right) = \inf_{\sigma \in S^N} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |x_i - y_{\sigma(i)}|^2$

$\mathbb{Q}^N / S^N \hookrightarrow \underline{P}(\mathbb{Q})$ (compactness: foldings but singularities ...)

Important equivalent formulation

$U \in C(\underline{P})$ (d metric)



$U \in C(L^2)$ $L^2 = L^2(\Omega)$ (Ω nontrivial proba. space)

AND $U(X) = U(\gamma)$ if $X \sim \gamma$

Allows to use both compactness (\underline{P}) and smoothness (L^2)

→ (new) diff. calc. on \underline{P} (an "smooth" $\rightarrow U$ "smooth")
 and PDEs on \underline{P} (limits of PDEs in $(\mathbb{R}^d)^N \dots$)

IV A CLASS OF DYN. EXS

STOCHASTIC CONTROL FOR EACH AGENT, IND. MOVES...

• FORMAL DERIVATION \rightarrow MFG

• JUSTIFICATION: NASH EQUIL. $N < \infty$ (cf. ex. Bensoussan-Fichse), $N \rightarrow \infty$

PDE on $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{Q})$,

partial integr. along characteristics in $\mathbb{P} \rightarrow$ MFG

ex. $T < \infty$

$$\text{(MFG)} \left\{ \begin{aligned}
 & \frac{\partial u}{\partial t} + F(D_x^2 u, D_x u, u, x, t; m) = 0 \\
 & \frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - D_x^2 \cdot (F_A m) - D_x \cdot (F_P m) = 0 \\
 & m|_{t=0} = m_0 \in \mathbb{P}, \quad u|_{t=T} = U(x; m(T))
 \end{aligned} \right.$$

$F = F(A, P, \dots)$ convex in (A, P) (stoch. control) for ex. $\nearrow_{u \in A}$

interpretation: u is the value f in (opt. criterion) of a generic agent \rightarrow HJB eq. with dep. upon m the density of players, yields an optimal strategy along which evolves m

Behind HJB eq \leftrightarrow Fwd FP eq.

limit terminal condition: $m(T) = m_T$ (planning)

EXAMPLES AND PARTICULAR CASES

- no m dep. \therefore HJB eq.
- no u dep. \therefore FP eq, Porous Media, Vlasov (Boltzmann eq.)
- A class of exs: $\nu \geq 0$, $H(x, p)$ convex in p

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial t} + \frac{\nu}{2} \Delta u + H(x, \nabla u) = F[m]$$

$$\frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - \frac{\nu}{2} \Delta m - \operatorname{div}_x \left(\frac{\partial H}{\partial p}(x, \nabla u) m \right) = 0$$

- $\nu = 0$, $H = \frac{1}{2} |p|^2$, $F[m](x) = F(m(x))$

Compressible Euler Eqs (barotropic)

- $\nu = 0$, $H = \frac{1}{2} |p|^m$, $F \equiv 0$, $m(T) = m_1$

Optimal Transport and Wasserstein distances

- stationary problems, $H = \frac{1}{2} |p|^2$, $\nu = 1$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} -\Delta \psi + (V_0 + F[\psi^2]) \psi = (\Delta \psi) \circ \\ \int \psi^2 = 1 \end{cases}$$

all semilinear elliptic equations $F[m](x) = F(m(x))$

Hartree equations $F[m] = V_1 * m$

- several populations: population dynamics for m_1, m_2, \dots
or birth and death

Mathematical results and perspectives

- existence: strong, weak, possibly nonexistence for local $F \dots$
- justification $N \rightarrow \infty$
- uniqueness: T small or F monotone, U monotone
(to be compared with the known results in the eqs...)
- stationary problems
- Fwd/Bwd PDEs on $[0, +\infty]$
- Extensions to several populations, free bdy pbs
- Hamiltonian structure if $F = \mathbb{F}'(m)$ / optimal control
And Optimal control of PDEs ($FP \leftrightarrow_{\mathcal{R}} HJB$).
- numerical analysis / numerical computations
- randomly heterogeneous populations
- Applications
- Corollaries
- Partial observations
- recursive utility